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Introduction
The papers in this special edition are based on
contributions to the symposium “Trustworthy nano-
technology” in Trondheim, Norway in June 2010.
This symposium was initiated by the research
project NANOTRUST,
1 funded by the Research
Council of Norway’s Programme for nanotechnology
and new materials. The motivation for the project was a
realization that the question of trust in nanotechnology
has been raised at a stage when the material, conceptual
and social body of nanotechnology has been in its
infancy. As trust or distrust in social and technological
systems generally is based in previous experiences with
these systems, nanotechnology raises new conceptual
and social challenges. A number of public engagement
exercises and research projects on the societal aspects
of nanotechnology have, due to the relative novelty
of the nano field, been fairly general in their
involvement with the technology. One of the potential
strengths of this project was its collaboration with a
project investigating the use of polymeric micro- or
nanoparticles to enhance vaccine formulations for
farmed salmon. Thus we raised the question of trust
in relation to a concrete case of nanotechnology
development, integrating ELSA research with the
technology research. Reflecting on trust in collabora-
tion with technologists at this early stage has both
advantages and drawbacks. It provides a unique
opportunity in creating a forum for ethical reflection,
opening the possibility for making a positive impact
on technology development. By engaging technology
researchers at this stage one can avoid the historical
role of ELSA research as an exercise in negative
ethics, i.e. ethics as border guard against real and
perceived risks and harm to environment and society.
On the other hand, being too far upstream may imply
that the engagement is reduced to hypothetical
discussions or conceptual clarifications.
Engaging with nanotechnology at this stage
means that attempts to foster public trust would
need to focus less on technological products and
more on the complex process of science. While a
products focus draws attention to the public’s
choices, understanding, knowledge and acceptabil-
ity of the product, a process focus draws attention
to the visions and goals as well as organization and
governance of nanotechnology. Thus the focus of
the project and the symposium shifted from the
conditions for public trust in general, to the body of
scientific practitioners and practices that is to be
trusted. This shift implies a corresponding shift
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trustworthiness and from what conditions trust to
what conditions trustworthiness. With this focus,
we aim at addressing to what extent nanotechnol-
ogy is providing a sound basis for fostering public
trust.
One important feature of recent approaches to
technology studies is that they draw attention to
extraordinary cases where there is much at stake,
values are disputed and high risks are involved. These
cases are often accompanied with high degree of
controversy, either scientifically or publically, calling
attention to post-normal strategies that widens the
circles of engaged stakeholders. Controversies func-
tion as a mobilizing factor. The normal case however
is not the one of controversies, but more like the case
of exploring PLGA particles for delivery of vaccines
in aquaculture. Projects like this one, that run under
the heading of nanotechnology display low degree of
substantial controversy. When the mechanisms of
society “talking back” to science [3]a r es t a g e d
through initiatives like the NANOTRUST project
there is little visible and unusual scientific or public
questioning—neither of individual projects of nano-
technology nor of nanoscience initiatives in general.
Nanoscience and -technology differs from genomics
in this respect: the “talking back” is staged in ways
that may suppress internal scientific conflicts, con-
flicts on specific products, engage NGOs or media
coverage in the ways that we have witnessed in
connection with genomics.
Therefore the symposium sought to explore how the
challenges related to trustworthiness can be raised in
projectswheretherearefewornocontroversiestospark
increasedscrutinyandscientificself-reflection.Whatdo
such normal cases require from the working scientist in
terms of their responsibility to display and be able to
normatively account for co-produced societal changes?
How can and should nanotechnologists meet the
challenge of societal interaction under such presumably
low risk circumstances? In this issue, three of the papers
are products of the reflections of the NANOTRUST
research group on the trustworthiness of a technology
application subject to uncertainty and ignorance regard-
ing potential harms to health and environment. In
addition, we include papers related to two of the invited
presentations that contextualized the issue of trustwor-
thiness based on other nanotechnology governance
research projects.
Technoscience, Complexity and Trust
The issue of trust has arguably been at the centre of
academic analyses of the complexities of modern
society. Several sociological works have focused on
risk as an inherent trait of life within a technologically
dominated democracy, and have seen trust as a
strategy to handle the complexities [9] and as a
lubricant making society function and a key to
progress [2]. Trust has a different role now compared
to relations in the transparent village communities of
the past [6]. The complexities of modern society have
several sources, but the interdependent technological
and social changes including rapid rise in living
standards, education and democratization of policy
processes are important elements. Given the central
role of technology development in providing the
material basis for these social changes, we see the
enhanced significance of trust as interlinked with
technology development in general.
Trust as the interrelation of technology and modern
society is at the core of a more specified issue
concerning the development of new technologies
and technological practices. As Gibbons [3] famously
stated:
Modern science has until recently flourished
partly because of a stable, underlying agreement
between its practitioners and the rest of society.
In other words, there has been a social contract
between science and society, an arrangement
built on trust which sets out the expectations of
the one held by the other, and which—in
principle—includes appropriate sanctions if
these expectations are not met.
He goes on to state that a new contract is
developing due to the complexities and accompa-
nying uncertainties of modern society, leading to a
new understanding of the basis for trust. Science
under these new conditions are elsewhere called mode
2 in contrast to the old mode 1 research.
Before we turn to how trust is re-emerging as a key
issue under these relatively new interrelations of
science, technology and society we can briefly
mention that trust even under this dying paradigm
was not primarily based on a belief that the scientists
were faultless and that nothing went wrong in the
research. The beneficial knowledge produced was
judged on a background of relative poverty, where
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improve life and bring welfare. Any improvement in
basic living conditions such as new medicines and
therapies, improvements in food production and food
security, reduction of harmful and painful working
conditions would be significant. Many negative side-
effects, such as toxic herbicides, dangerous machinery
or therapies would be acceptable. When the starting
conditions are bad, the benefits will be significant.
But the basis for public trust under a regime of
the unchallenged authority of experts is stronger
than these merely pragmatic grounds. In a society
with an asymmetrical relation between an educated
elite and a relatively uneducated public, there is a
paternalistic pattern to the relation between trustors
and trustee, paradigmatically expressed in the
doctor-patient relationship. Just like young children
accept parental authority and trust that their choices
are for the best, the lay public trusted science. In
this way we can say that the Age of Enlightenment
came late to the field of sciences, as compared to
other areas of society:
Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-
imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to
use one’s understanding without guidance from
another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its
cause lies not in lack of understanding, but in lack
of resolve and courage to use it without guidance
fromanother.Sapere Aude! “Have courage to use
your own understanding!”—that is the motto of
enlightenment. [7]
Speaking of mode 1 as a paternalistic mode of
science is certainly a simplified account, as scientific
authority was probably never completely unques-
tioned. Compared to the present role of science in
modern society, however, this account can illustrate
the altered relationship between science and society.
When children grow up, the basis for asymmetry in
the trust relation is changed and, hopefully, a
symmetrical relation of trust based on dialogue
develops. The children “talk back” to the parents,
who listen to them. But emergence from immaturity is
not the same as always talking back. It is rather a
matter of freely deciding when to talk back and when
to trust the authority, be it parents or scientific
expertise. Onora O’Neill [10] has pointed out how
this altered relation between expertise and lay people
has changed the field of medicine, and a similar
analysis is relevant for the role of expertise in modern
society in general.
Under this new paradigm for the relation between
science and society, the positive end results of the
risk-benefit equation is not self-evident any more, if
we accept that it ever was. In an affluent society, the
promised benefits of research are not sufficient to
accept the risks because we perceive scientific
research differently, and we know that the scope of
expert knowledge is limited. This calls for new ways
of conceiving of the conditions for societal trust in
technology. Within this picture, nanotechnology raises
some special challenges, as it is presented as a new
field of science and technology. The basic story
promises that new materials and methods will appear
with new properties opening up for a number of
positive effects. Experience tells us that new, power-
ful, beneficial technologies usually have been accom-
panied by more or less unexpected harm in a wide
range of fields such as energy production, transporta-
tion technology, the development of pesticides,
medicines and food products to mention some. If we
believe the promises of the powers of technologies
employing the nanoscale, we should suspect that there
are comparable risks involved. We also know from
recent events within genomics and medical technol-
ogies that when research results are applied as
technologies in environment and society, science
based risk assessments tend to be inadequate. The
new relation between science and society and the lack
of clarity about the nature of nanotechnology calls for
an analysis of the conditions for trust under these
circumstances.
Trust
There are many ways to understand the altered role of
trust in modern society. Functional accounts of trust
in institutions dominate sociology literature, but the
paradigmatic instances of trust are not about institu-
tions but concerns asymmetrical relationships be-
tween people. The Danish theologian Løgstrup [8]
points out that the human condition is one of
vulnerability and holds that this is the basis for trust.
Trusting someone involves an appeal that they take
responsibility for our well-being without any guaran-
tee that they actually will. We recognize the asym-
metry of a paternalistic relationship in his account.
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two equal parties can trust one another in a relation of
reciprocal asymmetry. Still, this is quite different from
cognitive accounts that see trust as reasonable expect-
ations about how the trustee will act. One example is
Hardin’s theory of encapsulated interest, where the
basis for the relation is the trustor’s belief that the
trustee has integrated the interests of the trustor in her
own interest ([6]: 17). But although Hardin’s theory
seems to cover many central cases of trust, there are
some important and relevant instances that cannot be
explained by his account. Sometimes we trust people
that we do not really believe care the least about our
interests, simply because we have no better choice.
Refugees around the world do that every day in order
to escape. A cognitivist could reply that this is
desperation, not trust, but it is typical of the way
people in vulnerable situations tend to act. A theory
that cannot account for the situations where we leave
our fate in the hands of people we have no knowledge
about, does not really capture essential aspects of
trust. When Luhmann says that the function of trust in
modern society is to reduce complexity, the implica-
tion is that we do not need to know the intentions of
those we trust. If we knew, we would not need to trust
them. Another case not explained by cognitivist
theories is that we trust people in order to induce
trustworthiness ([1]: 350 ff). In these cases we trust
people despite inadequate knowledge sufficient to
predict their action.
Such cases pose problems for cognitivist theo-
ries, and it is probably more correct to classify trust
as an attitude, which is in line with Løgstrup’s
account that we should regard interpersonal trust as
a basic fact of the human condition, a way we
perceive the world. A related observation is that in
many instances “[t]rust can emerge when I choose
to act as if I trust, that is, choose to make myself
vulnerable to others, and find that nothing ill
happen to me.” ([14]: 113). On this account, trust
is neither as a belief nor a feeling but can be
compared to a Kuhnian paradigm, a way of “seeing
as” (Ibid, 102 ff). Distrust is not the normal state, but
a consequence of failure or repeated failures of the
trustee to live up to the expectations placed in them.
We can also postulate a kind of distrust by analogy,
in the sense that if we have negative experiences
with someone, we tend to distrust similar people,
groups or institutions.
This latter point can explain why trust, or rather
distrust, has become a focus for discussions of
technology and science in modern society, despite
trust being the default position and an integral aspect
of life in modern society. Several episodes involving
technologists and other forms of expertise have been
widely published as grounds for distrust in scientific
expertise. Likewise, scientific controversies may
contribute to this distrust. Even the new regimes of
accountability and transparency, which are meant to
enhance trust, may paradoxically lead to distrust
[10,11]. The reception of genetically modified food
in Europe has been an indication that distrust may
represent a significant obstacle to development within
science and technology. One explanation is that the
scientific community acts as if they live under the
conditions described above as mode 1, and fail to see
that the paternalistic expert role is outdated. If they
want to live up to the new task of science, scientists
must engage in a dialogue with society.
Trust in Nanotechnology
Nanotechnology is a peculiar case for the study of the
interaction between scientific expertise and society.
We do not know whether it has been “contaminated”
by the distrust of genomics for example in Europe,
but the way the nano field is developed indicates a
strong wish to avoid similar controversies. One
example is the Royal Society & Royal Academy of
Engineering [13] report with its focus on risk and
public dialogue. But nanotechnology is a confusing
theme for dialogue, because the technology has no
focus in objects and methods. Nano is defined by size
and socioeconomic factors, and consists of a collec-
tion of technologies from different scientific disci-
plines using different methods involving materials
with very different properties. This is not a problem in
most contexts as research is not dependent on what it
is called, although funding to some extent is. When
the issue is trust, however, the inclusiveness of the
nanotechnology label becomes problematic. What
exactly do we ask people to relate to if we ask them
whether they trust nanotechnology? We may trust the
research institutions or the people involved in it, or
the research groups. Or we put our faith in the
governmental control systems which can be described
as systematic, institutionalized distrust that is a
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appears, so the authorities have systematized control
routines that operate on a generalized distrust.
Because of this distrust, we can trust the systems
without knowing the researchers personally. But these
types of trust presuppose a kind of unity to the
institutions we trust that we cannot expect from
nanotechnology. This is the background for the
NANOTRUST project.
The NANOTRUST Project
This project started out from the assumption that trust
is a necessary prerequisite for social robust develop-
ment and application of nanotechnology. Nanotech-
nology is framed by scientific uncertainty and
ignorance both regarding positive and negative
potentials of the technology, and we assume that
independent research and development requires that
politicians and the public have faith in the capabilities
of science to handle these uncertainties. This requires
that the scientists understand the impact of their
activity as well as the limits to their knowledge and
that this knowledge is communicated in a way that
enhances trust. In addition, it is required that the
scientists understand and accept public values and
expectations for their activity. Therefore the aim of
the project has been to gather perspectives on risk,
social values and expectations with regard to introduc-
tion of nanotechnology, using nanoparticles for delivery
of vaccines as our case study. To do that we cooperated
withatechnologyprojectusingnanoparticlesasvaccine
carrier in fish farming. We wanted to combine three
strands of ELSA studies in one project: (1) A
scientifically based risk and uncertainty analysis. (2)
Engagement of the nanotechnology researchers in
discussions of how they conceive of their own research
andits societalimplications.(3) A normative analysisof
the basis for trust in this particular nanotechnology
application, in order to study the relation between
responsibility and trust connected to risk management
and communication.
While carrying out the project, we realized that in
designing the project we made the common mistake
of talking about trust while being mainly concerned
with trustworthiness [5]. Accordingly, we turned our
focus from products to the complex process of science
and the visions and goals as well as organization and
governance of nanotechnology. The strength and
weakness of our project is that it is an ordinary
research project where, arguably, there is little at stake
and we would not expect controversies which often
function as a mobilising factor for engagement.
Therefore we arranged a symposium in order to
explore how the challenges related to trustworthiness
can be raised in circumstances where there are few or
no controversies to spark increased scrutiny and
scientific self-reflection. We wanted to explore what
such normal cases require from the researchers
regarding their responsibility to display and norma-
tively account for co-produced societal changes. How
can and should nanotechnologists meet the challenge
of societal interaction under such presumably low risk
circumstances?
Trustworthy Nanotechnology?
One of the main issues in the governance of new
technologies has been how to handle risks and
uncertainties. The case of nanovaccine in aquaculture
is not a high risk case, judging from studies of the use
of these particles in other animals. But there are
differences between fish and mammals, and the
possible release of nanoparticles may raise new
challenges in a marine environment. In the article
‘Mapping Uncertainties in the Upstream’ Kåre N.
Nielsen, Børge N. Fredriksen and Anne I. Myhr
suggest how to handle these uncertainties. The article
is a result of the cooperation between the fish vaccine
researchers and ELSA researchers, and exemplifies
one of the results of the joint learning processes in
integrated research. By using an Upstream Oversight
Assessment modified with elements from an uncer-
tainty analysis framework they seek to identify
required areas of research based on literature study
and the experiences of the nanovaccine project.
The novelty of the project raises particular chal-
lenges for a study of this kind, and this demonstrates
one of the problems in relation to trustworthiness
understood as transparency. For example, if the
researchers communicate uncertainty regarding the
scenario that these nanoparticles could act as “Trojan
horses” making harmful substances in the environ-
ment enter the human body, while stating that this is
highly implausible, the result can still be rejection of
the project on very weak grounds. How to conduct
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sponsible way calls for reflective judgment. The
article suggests that the UOA is useful for an early
mapping of benefits and concerns, and for identifying
areas in need of further research. The cooperation
between ELSA and technology researchers indicates
one possible path towards early stage evaluations of
possible negative side effects of concrete research
projects, in order to facilitate a more robust nano-
technology development.
When there is scientific uncertainty regarding risks
to environment and health, the precautionary principle
is suggested as basis for regulation in a range of
international treatises and policy documents. The
principle has been formulated in a number of ways,
but it is probably correct to say that all attempts have
been subject to criticism from a variety of angles.
Precaution is a regulatory principle that is simulta-
neously accepted and controversial. Some years ago,
an UNESCO expert group suggested a new and more
comprehensive approach to the implementation of the
principle. In the paper ‘Precaution or integrated
responsibility approach to nanovaccines in fish
farming?’ Anne I. Myhr and Bjørn K. Myskja analyze
the advantages and disadvantages of the UNESCO
version by employing it to the use of nanoparticles for
delivery of vaccines in aquaculture.
This version of the principle has some clear
advantages as compared with earlier formulations
by suggesting a procedural approach drawing on
reflective judgment and public engagement in order
to determine how to handle concrete cases. The
authors do, however, criticize the UNESCO version
for vagueness of key concepts and some weakly
founded normative assumptions. They suggest that
the precautionary approach should be supplemented
by combining the ideal of best scientific practice
with the insights of Jonas’ ethics of responsibility
to ensure a sound basis for political decisions on
technology regulation. On their account, scientific
and political responsibility can be an alternative
framework for the discussion of how to handle
potentially harmful use of nanotechnology. Without
discarding the need for public engagement, they
emphasize that technologists and ELSA researchers
are responsible for making a thorough and sound
assessment of the technology and the societal issues
involved, and share their best opinions with the
public and political authorities.
We have pointed out earlier that the nanovaccine
project is an example of nanotechnology projects that
appear to be uncontroversial, and can be regarded as
far from the major controversies dominating the
academic literature on the challenges of this novel
technology field. Kåre N. Nielsen, Trond G. Åm and
Rune Nydal suggests an interpretation of the nano-
technology research field as a centre-periphery axis
where this project is clearly situated on the periphery.
Their paper ‘Centre and Periphery of Nano- A
Norwegian Context’ points out that the scale-based
definition of nanotechnology has been accompanied
by controversies regarding the value of the research
field. Claims of emptiness and hype, accompanied by
the suspicion that the main function of the nano label
has been to secure new sources of funding, raise the
question whether the field is “worthy of our trust”.
The authors instead suggest a mode 2-approach,
understanding nanotechnology as context driven
research. Under this perspective they build their
discussion on Rocco & Bainbridges definition of
nanotechnology as novel nanoscale technologies
which are conditioned by a convergence of traditional
disciplines with potentially great socioeconomic im-
pact. This standard vision is at the centre of
nanotechnology, and here we find strategic research
initiatives that seek to reorganize existing research
according to this vision. In their interviews with
researchers, the Nanolab at the Norwegian University
of Science and Technology serves as a paradigmatic
example of this work at the centre. Peripheral
nanotechnology research activity, such as the nano-
vaccine project, is not marked by being committed to
this vision. Such projects are oriented towards solving
particular problems, and their acceptance of the nano
label can be regarded as incidental. Still, their activity
provides a crucial arena for discussing and validating
what is to be achieved through the work of reorga-
nization that takes place at the centre.
This reflection represents a widening of the
perspective on trustworthy nanotechnology compared
to the first two articles, from a project based focus on
the nanovaccine case, to a process based focus on
nanotechnology as a research field. One crucial
general nanotechnology question concerns how to
do research in a way deserving of public trust. As
mentioned above, one common strategy in modern
society is to regulate the field and establish control
routines based on the principle of systematic, deper-
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forced to behave in a way that ensures that the
institution or practice is trustworthy. But they them-
selves are not trustworthy in a normative sense. If I
am forced to act morally right, my act is only in
accordance with morality, not morally good, as Kant
points out. Besides, regulation of morality may turn
out to be counterproductive, if the rules and control
mechanisms themselves produce incentives to act
contrary to the intention of the regulation. In this
way, a tight regulation with strict control mechanisms
may create loopholes that stimulate people to act
contrary to the ideals inherent in the normative system
([12]: 69 ff). Stimulating reflection on responsible
practices may be a better solution. One such tool can
be self-regulatory mechanisms such as codes of
conduct and other forms of soft law.
In the article ‘Conversations about responsible nano-
research’, Kamilla L. Kjølberg and Roger Strand
addressthequestionofresponsiblenanoresearchsimply
byaskingtheresearchersthemselveshowtheyconceive
of responsible nanotechnology. Taking the ‘European
Commission recommendation on a code of conduct for
responsible nanosciences and nanotechnologies re-
search’ as point of departure, they engaged in con-
versations with a group of researchers from different
fields of nanoscience. They knew the researchers from
earlier collaborations and, perhaps more important, the
researchers knew the authors and their perspective on
nanotechnology governance. Thus there was already
some basis for reciprocal trust, and some familiarity
with the challenges identified with mode 2-science. On
the basis of these conversations, the authors distinguish
six idealized types of reactions to the document. They
found a plurality of viewpoints both within the group
andwithintheindividualresearcher,inthesensethatthe
interviewees did not conform to one ideal type.
In the final part of the paper, Kjølberg and Strand
present three conceptions of responsible nanoresearch.
Even if the concept of responsibility developed in the
code of conduct is a sound basis for reflection, it is not
fully adequate, they argue. In order to develop a full
notionofresponsibility,weneedincreasedawareness of
moral choices, on the model of Arendt’sm o r a l
judgment as “thinking”. In this way, the individual
responsibility of researchers is emphasized.
In the final paper in this special issue, we are
presented with a different kind of conversation
concerning governance of nanotechnology. Heidrun
Åm’s ‘Trust as Glue in Nanotechnology Governance’
presents a reflection on an exercise in stakeholder
dialogue. Here the group of participants is extended
beyond the researchers themselves, and include
representatives of government, industry, trade unions
and non-governmental organizations taking part in the
German NanoKommission. The main focus of this
study is how a group of stakeholders with diverse
interests develops internal bonds of mutual trust based
on their cooperative dialogue. These bonds lead to the
formation of limits to what it is allowable to think and
express in nanotechnology governance.
The article presents three vignettes about the
work of the German NanoKommission illustrating
that governance in practice can create social units
where mutual recognition and trust serve as the
glue holding the complex structure together. The
participants develop mutual responsibility for the
cooperative work. This kind of collaboration be-
tween different interest groups is certainly benefi-
cial if the goal is reduction of public controversies
in order to secure undisturbed technology develop-
ment, with the appearance of public legitimacy. Åm
argues that this is not adequate if we evaluate the
process against the ideals of deliberative democra-
cy, which are generally accepted as the normative
basis for public engagement. Deliberative democra-
cy emphasizes that all affected parties should be
represented in the dialogue in order to secure a
legitimate basis for policy decisions. So if psycho-
logical group processes of bonding between repre-
sentatives of different interests create new patterns
of loyalties, the basis for trusting the forum is
undermined. Trust between the members serves as
the glue ensuring good conditions for internal
cooperation, but it weakens the trustworthiness of
the group externally.
Acknowledgements The three first articles of this special
issue are results of the NANOTRUST project funded by the
Research Council of Norway. I would like to thank the
participants of the ‘Trustworthy nanotechnology’-symposium
for their contribution to the dialogue within the project, and
reviewers for their contributions to improving this collection of
papers.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial License which
permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are
credited.
Nanoethics (2011) 5:49–56 55References
1. Elster J (2007) Explaining social behaviour: more nuts and
bolts for the social sciences. Oxford University Press,
Oxford
2. Fukuyama F (1995) Trust: the social virtues and the
creation of prosperity. Free Press, New York
3. Gibbons M (1999) Science’s new social contract with
society. Nature 402:C81–C84
4. Grimen H (2009) Hva er tillit? Universitetsforlaget, Oslo
5. Hardin R (1996) Trustworthiness. Ethics 107:26–42
6. Hardin R (2006) Trust. Polity, Cambridge
7. Kant I (1983) What is enlightenment. In: Kant I (ed)
Perpetual peace and other essays. Hackett, Indianapolis,
pp 41–46
8. Løgstrup KE (1956) Den Etiske Fordring. Gyldendal,
København
9. Luhmann N (1968) Vertrauen: Ein Mechanismus der
Reduktion sozialer Komplexität. Ferdinan Enke, Stuttgart
10. O’Neill O (2002) Autonomy and trust in bioethics. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge
11. O’Neill O (2006) Transparency and the ethics of commu-
nication. In: Hood C, Heald D (eds) Transparency—the key
to better governance? Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp
75–90
12. Pogge T (2002) World poverty and human rights. Polity,
Cambridge
13. Royal Society & Royal Academy of Engineering
(2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportuni-
ties and uncertainties. Royal Society, London, Re-
trieved March 12, 2011, from http://www.nanotec.org.
uk/finalReport.htm
14. Weckert J (2005) Trust in cyberspace. In: Cavalier RJ (ed)
The impact of the internet on our moral lives. State
University of New York Press, Albany, pp 95–117
56 Nanoethics (2011) 5:49–56